How to boost EU influence in Central Asia

Russia’s war of conquest against Ukraine has affected its position and influence in the so-called near abroad. The countries of Central Asia were often considered part of Russia’s sphere of influence. They had strong ties with her not only historically, but also economically and militarily. However, the current geopolitical situation, as well as sanctions against Russia and the weaponization of the financial system, have changed the domestic political realities in Central Asia. The desire for partnerships outside of Russia has intensified, and some actors, such as the European Union, are showing increasing interest in the region.

Relations between the EU and Central Asia are built not only on a solid legal basis , but also on an understanding of the need to work together for regional and global security and development. One of the latest EU strategies, namely the Global Gateway initiative , focuses on investment and infrastructure development in the world and in particular may be of interest to the countries of Central Asia. But is the EU doing enough to support this partnership, or is it missing out on an opportunity to strengthen its position in the region?    

Positive perception of the EU

Of course, relations between the EU and Central Asia have their own history and dynamics, including many factors and developments both in the region and beyond. Popular political analyzes often highlight competition for regional hegemony. However, they ignore micro-level developments affecting Central Asia’s opportunities for multilateral cooperation with external partners such as the EU, as well as the growing geopolitical involvement of many different countries in the region and a lack of understanding of the local context.               

Geopolitical tensions in the region, as well as foreign interference, are rising at an unprecedented level. While the EU and the US have stressed that they will not persuade the Central Asian states to cooperate with them at the expense of not cooperating with Russia and China, German Foreign Minister Annalene Berbock said in 2022 that Germany does not want Central Asia to “submit to Russia or depended on China . In turn, the speaker of the Russian Duma, Vyacheslav Volodin, argued that “Uzbekistan has enough wisdom to assess the likely consequences of cooperation with the United States ,” thereby fueling Russian anti-Western rhetoric. 

The perspectives of the Central Asian countries themselves vary. There are many formats for cooperation between Central Asia and the EU, which Tajik President Emomali Rahmon recently called “useless” and designed to “pump out information . “

But Uzbekistan’s relations with the EU have improved markedly. In a joint statement to the press, President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev and President of the European Council Charles Michel said: “The parties welcomed the desire of the European Union to strengthen ties and interregional cooperation with Uzbekistan and Central Asia.”  

The authorities of Kazakhstan also “confirm their desire to create a solid and promising basis for cooperation between the EU and Central Asia” . On this basis, it becomes clear that relations between the EU and Central Asia are dynamic and, with rare exceptions like the President of Tajikistan, quite good.

Misunderstanding the local context

The EU and other external actors are largely focused on external threats to Central Asia, such as Afghanistan, but lack understanding of the region’s internal problems. For example, Islamist sentiments in the societies of Central Asia, combined with extremism caused by a wide range of socio-economic factors (these include insufficient education, lack of social support, limited economic opportunities, etc.) are a growing problem. Nationalist ideas also play an important role (calls for communication in local languages, rejection of “non-Central Asian” or “non-Islamic” values), partly caused by the increasing dominance of ethnic Central Asians.over the declining number of representatives of other nationalities who communicate in Russian.     

In fact, the EU (and not only it) is not ready to respond qualitatively to internal crises in Central Asia, such as the unrest in Kazakhstan last January and the protests in the autonomous republic of Karakalpakstan in Uzbekistan. Usually the reason for this inability and ignorance lies in the lack of knowledge of the local language and context and the resulting inability to conduct evidence-based analysis. Although it is difficult to cover all the information, segmented analysis, limited to data from official sources or available exclusively in Russian, creates the additional problem of missing out on large amounts of important data, which leads to misinterpretation of local realities.    

Collaboration whenever possible

Despite the high dependence on Russia as the main trading partner of the Central Asian countries and the largest source of foreign exchange generated by the inflow of remittances from labor migrants, the region follows the EU and US sanctions regime, recognizing the consequences of its non- compliance .

In 2021, Uzbekistan joined the EU GSP+ (Generalized Scheme of Preferences) to be able to export 6,200 types of goods to the EU without customs duties, which was an important milestone in the history of EU-Central Asia cooperation. It is clear that for the EU the GSP+ is primarily a tool for competing with traditional trading partners for market access in the Central Asian states. Of course, for the countries of Central Asia, GSP+ is economically beneficial and allows for trade diversification in order to partially offset the losses incurred due to sanctions against Russia and the subsequent economic downturn. Trade compensation remains only partial, as it is unrealistic to fully diversify trade flows from Central Asia to Europe. Now the main trade route is the so-called northern corridor to Russia,although rail links across the Caspian Sea from Central Asia to Europe are already operational . 

At the same time, the EU is trying not to jeopardize its relations with the Central Asian states by depoliticizing their cooperation. By emphasizing common ground and focusing on the areas of cooperation covered by the Global Gate Initiative, the EU is not pushing for political reforms but instead is focusing on other areas such as digitalization, climate and research.

Based on the study “Forecasts for Central Asia” , conducted by the Foundation. Friedrich Ebert and partners, experts from Central Asia expect that over the next three years, EU development cooperation and its Connecting Europe and Asia Strategy will have a positive impact on Central Asia, in line with EU policies on climate, good governance and human rights. It is obvious that the countries of Central Asia are currently facing various challenges of an economic, social, political and other nature, as well as trying to carry out complex reforms. Therefore, national governments give preference to European investments, technical assistance and experience.

However, the partnership will be limited until there is an understanding of the current complex political context in Central Asia and geopolitical realities for national governments. The EU must acquire more detailed and specific knowledge about the region, abandon stereotypes and treat the countries of the region not as another field of geopolitical competition, but as valuable partners with their own point of view, deserving respect and understanding.  

source: ipg-journal